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The Intentional History of Words 
The present work aims to establish intention as an important factor in learning and memory by 
demonstrating the cumulative impact of specific intentional processes on memory for word stimuli. 
Intention, as “an aim that guides action; an objective” (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the 
English Language, 2000), can be internally generated, as in chocolate cravings in the middle of writing. 
Intention can also be externally evoked by the context, as in, there is an ice-cream truck outside, so I’m 
going to get ice-cream. Or, I want to go get ice-cream—intention does not require overt action. In 
psychology laboratories, intention is instilled into subjects through task instructions. It has been shown 
that the type of task that subjects perform on stimuli have specific impact on their memory about the 
stimuli. According to the transfer-appropriate processing principle of memory (Bransford, Franks, Morris, 
& Stein, 1979; Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977), the specific processing of specific stimuli facilitates 
later processing of the same stimuli, to the extent that the earlier and later events have overlapping 
processes. Overt task processing is only one type of intentional situation. Intention in other situations, 
such as evoked by the context, can also cause memory for the target to be specific to the intention. The 
result of such context-evoked intentional process is described in the encoding specificity principle of 
memory (Tulving, 1979; Tulving & Thomson, 1973), which suggests that the most efficient memory 
retrieval cues are cues that match the specific encoding operations performed on the input stimuli. The 
present work integrates the transfer-appropriate processing and encoding specificity principles of memory 
into the intention-specific learning principle, with the emphasis on the intentional act involving a stimulus 
(intention as the guide for action) and the interpretation of the stimulus as the result of the intentional act. 
Applying the intention-specific learning principle to the instance theory of memory (Logan, 1988), the 
present work arrived at novel predictions about stimulus frequency effects in memory tasks. 
To achieve a goal, one must attend to the situation. Intention as goal-orientedness requires 
attention. Logan and Etherton (1994) suggested that attention is a sufficient, and maybe even necessary, 
condition for binding co-occurring elements into an instance. An instance can be considered the integral 
experience of intention, its target, and the context (elements that co-occurs with the target). In accordance 
with the instance theory of memory (Logan, 1988), the present work assumes that 1) each encounter with 
a stimulus is encoded and stored as a separate instance; 2) the encoding of an instance into memory is a 
necessary consequence of attention. To the extent that an event is fully attended, remembering is 
obligatory, even if the remembering may not be perfect (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Moscovitch, 1994); 3) 
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the retrieval of instances is a necessary consequence of attention. Attending to a stimulus causes 
obligatory retrieval of the instances associated with the stimulus, even if the retrieval may fail. 
Applying the intention-specific learning principle to the instance theory of memory (Logan, 
1988), the present work proposes that 1) the obligatorily encoded instances are specific to the intention 
during encoding; 2) the obligatorily retrieved instances are specific to the intention at retrieval. Imagine 
intention as the string that strings together instances. Instances are encoded onto a particular string, and 
instances are retrieved along a particular string. 
The instances strung together by intentions are hereby referred to as the “intentional history” of a 
stimulus. Each stimulus has a past, an intentional history that registers the past engagement of the 
stimulus in various intentional acts, and that extends far beyond what happens in psychology laboratories 
(unless they are novel stimuli created in the lab, of course, like “Greebles”; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). 
Following the assumptions of obligatory encoding and obligatory retrieval of instances, the present work 
suggests that the intentional history of a stimulus is inherent to the stimulus representation and will 
constrain current intentional processing of the stimulus. 
A straightforward way to summarize the intentional history of a stimulus with respect to an 
intentional act is by the frequency with which the stimulus has been engaged in the act. And related to, 
but also dissociable from the intention-specific frequency, is the probability with which the stimulus has 
been involved in the intentional act (The relation between intention-specific frequency and intention-
specific probability will be described in detail in later sections). Researchers have considered the 
frequency of a stimulus to be part of the stimulus representation, for example, word frequency is assumed 
to be part of a word’s semantic representation (Forster & Davis, 1985; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996). The 
intentional history approach, however, suggests that the frequency information in a stimulus 
representation is not simply the frequency of the stimulus independent of the intentional acts at 
acquisition, but frequency and probability information specific to the intentional acts. 
Word frequency has been a potent variable affecting various kinds of memory task performances 
(e.g., Gregg, 1976; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996; Scarborough, Cortese, & 
Scarborough, 1977). However, the intention-specific principle implies that word frequency and intention-
specific frequency or probability have likely been confounded in previous studies. Word frequency effects 
may in fact have been intention-specific frequency or probability effects. According to the intention-
specific learning principle, the number of times a subject has encountered a stimulus while engaging in 
intentional act A will affect how he performs task A on the stimulus. However, the number of times that 
the subject has encountered the stimulus in intentional act A should not necessarily affect how he can 
perform task B on the stimulus, unless there is sufficient overlap between tasks A and B. That is, only 
intention-specific frequency or probability should affect current intentional processing on a stimulus, and 
not stimulus frequency independent of acquisition intentions. The intention-specific learning principle 
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predicts intention-specific frequency or probability effects in memory tasks, but not general stimulus 
frequency effects. This is the primary hypothesis of the present work. This hypothesis is tested in the 
context of semantic judgments on the meanings of words, with both explicit and implicit memory tasks. 
 
Explicit and Implicit Memory Tasks 
The present work tested the intentional history hypothesis with both explicit and implicit memory 
tasks to show that intentional history may be a general property of memory representations for stimuli. 
Everything we know about memory is probed with a certain task (Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989). A 
major distinction between the types of memory tasks is the contrast between explicit and implicit memory 
tasks. Typical explicit memory tasks include word recognition and recall (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; 
Gregg, 1976; Mandler, 1980). In recognition, subjects try to distinguish between words presented in the 
study episodes from non-studied words. In recall, subjects try to generate words that have appeared in the 
study episodes. Recognition and recall are referred to as episodic memory tasks, or explicit memory tasks, 
because in these tasks subjects explicitly try to remember particular episodes. Typical implicit memory 
tasks include lexical decision, word identification, and word stem completion tasks (Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981; Scarborough et al., 1977; Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982; for reviews, see Roediger & 
McDermott, 1993; Schacter, 1987). In these tasks, subjects can make word-nonword decisions faster, 
identify words with higher accuracy, or complete more word stems after having been exposed to the 
target words. The facilitation for previously presented targets words is termed repetition priming. 
According to the episodic or instance view of repetition priming, words are identified through 
representations of prior episodes or instances involving the words (see Bowers, 2000, and Tenpenny, 
1995 for reviews on the abstractionist versus episodic view of repetition priming). Repetition priming 
arises because recent episodes are in general more accessible than older episodes (Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby, 
Baker, & Brooks, 1989). Or, as suggested by the instance theory (Logan, 1988, 1990), adding instances 
will speedup the race between instances and lead to a faster response. Repetition priming occurs 
irrespective of subjective awareness or control. Memory tasks involving the repetition priming 
phenomenon have been referred to as implicit memory tasks, in contrast to more traditional memory 
tasks, such as recognition and recall, in which subjects explicitly try to remember (Graf & Schacter, 1985; 
Schacter & Graf, 1986). 
Because explicit and implicit memory task performances are differentially affected by variables 
such as hippocampal lesion (Cohen & Squire, 1980; Graf, Squire, & Mandler. 1984; Graf & Schacter, 
1985; Shimamura & Squire, 1984, 1989; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1978) and levels-of-processing 
manipulations (Craik, Moscovitch, & McDowd, 1994; Graf, Mandler, & Haden, 1982; Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981), researchers have discussed whether explicit and implicit memory tasks have tapped into different 
memory systems. Some of the postulated system schemes include the ternary classification of episodic, 
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semantic, and procedural systems (Tulving, 1985), the declarative versus procedural (or non-declarative) 
systems (Squire, 1986, 1992), the locale versus taxon systems (Nadel, 1992), and the hippocampal versus 
cortical learning systems (McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995). Explicit memory tasks are 
attributed to the episodic, declarative, locale, or hippocampal system, which requires intact hippocampal 
function. Implicit memory tasks are ascribed to the semantic, procedural, taxon, or cortical system, which 
can apparently function independent of hippocampal capabilities. 
Advocates of processing theories (Blaxton, 1989; Jacoby, 1983; Roediger, 1990; Roediger et al., 
1989) have argued that many dissociations between explicit and implicit memory tasks can be explained 
in terms of the overlap between acquisition and test tasks, and that transfer-appropriate processing 
(Bransford et al., 1979; Morris et al., 1977) is a more parsimonious account regarding memory task 
performance. For example, the levels-of-processing manipulation can vary semantic versus rhyme 
processing between acquisition conditions. Semantic processing affects recognition and recall 
performance because these tasks are conceptually-driven. Semantic processing has little impact on word 
identification because identification is a perceptually-driven task. 
Whether the dissociation between explicit and implicit memory tasks should be explained by 
distinct memory systems or by the type of processing involved (e.g. conceptual versus perceptual), it is 
important to examine the effects of intentional history with both explicit and implicit memory tasks if we 
wish to show that intentional history is a general property of memory representations. To the extent that 
the memory subserving recognition, recall, and repetition priming task performances is episodic, the 
intentional history of words should affect the explicit, as well as, the implicit memory task performances. 
But, the way in which intentional history affects explicit and implicit memory task performances may be 
different. For example, two measures of intentional history, the frequency and the probability of the 
stimulus being engaged in the acquisition acts, may have differential impact on explicit and implicit 
memory task performances. Differences in the effects of intentional history on explicit and implicit 
memory tasks can provide new clues to the mechanisms underlying the distinction between these tasks. It 
is therefore the secondary goal of the present work to assess the differential impact of intention-specific 
frequency and intention-specific probability on explicit and implicit memory tasks. In the next sections I 
shall briefly review word frequency effects in implicit memory repetition priming tasks, then go over 
word frequency effects in the explicit memory tasks of word recognition and free recall (recall without 
cues). 
 
Word Frequency Effects in Repetition Priming 
Word frequency effects in repetition priming have been consistently reported in lexical decision 
(Duchek & Neely, 1989; Forster & Davis, 1984; Scarborough et al., 1977) and perceptual identification 
tasks (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Hayman, 1987; Kirsner, Milech, & Stumpfel, 1986). High 
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frequency words are responded to faster as legitimate words, or identified more accurately, than low 
frequency words. However, compared to high frequency words, low frequency words demonstrate greater 
amounts of repetition priming from having been presented in the study phase. From the instance theory 
point of view (Logan, 1988, 1990), one more addition to a large set of instance will have less impact on 
the rate of instance retrieval compared with cases where there are fewer prior instances. From another 
perspective, the power law of learning dictates that increments in learning should be smaller near the 
asymptote than near the beginning of learning.  
Word frequency effects in repetition priming are of theoretical interest because they suggest that 
semantic representations are stored as episodic instances instead of abstract lexicons (Bowers, 2000; 
Tenpenny, 1995). Word frequency effects in repetition priming are readily explained from the episodic or 
instance perspective (Logan, 1988; 1990), yet they present a challenge for the abstractionist view of 
semantic representations. The abstractionist view suggests that words are represented as abstract lexical 
entries, with high frequency words located at the beginning of the search path and low frequency words 
towards the end of the search path (Forster & Davis, 1984). To account for the comparatively large 
amount of repetition priming low frequency words receive from prior presentation, the abstractionist view 
has to assume the accessibility of lexical entries to be highly labile. This goes against the abstractionist 
assumption that the differential accessibility of high versus low frequency words reflects fairly stable 
organizational properties of the lexicon. Consequently, word frequency effects in repetition priming have 
been considered markers of episodic memory trace retrieval. 
However, word frequency effects have not been consistently observed in other implicit memory 
tasks such as word stem or fragment completion tasks (for a review, see Roediger & McDermott, 1993). 
While MacLeod (1989) and Roediger, Weldon, Stadler, and Riegler (1992) found more repetition priming 
for low frequency than high frequency words, Tenpenny and Shoben (1992) reported an opposite pattern, 
with more repetition priming for high frequency than low frequency words. 
The intention-specific learning principle suggests that frequency effects in repetition priming 
should be explained with respect to the frequency or probability of the intentional acts being performed 
on the stimulus in past acquisitions, instead of the frequency of the stimulus independent of past 
acquisition acts. When the task used to measure repetition priming matches the intentional history 
invoked by the study task, intention-specific frequency or probability effects should be observed. 
Conversely, if the test task does not overlap with the intentional history invoked by the study task, no 
frequency or probability effects should be expected. From this perspective, word identification and lexical 
decision tasks may be special cases in which the test tasks matches well with the intentional acts in 
everyday word acquisition situations. Because often times reading a word entails intentional identification 
and lexical access processes, the acquisition act frequency and word frequency are confounded. As a 
consequence, intention-specific frequency effects in repetition priming would appear as word frequency 
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effects in word identification and lexical decision tasks (Duchek & Neely, 1989; Forster & Davis, 1984; 
Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Hayman, 1987; Kirsner et al., 1986). At the same time, it should come 
as no surprise that when the test task deviated from typical reading processes, as is the case in word stem 
or fragment completion tasks, this seemingly word frequency effect had only been inconsistently 
observed (MacLeod, 1989; Roediger et al., 1992; Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Tenpenny & Shoben, 
1992). 
The failure to consistently observe word frequency effects in some repetition priming tasks does 
not mean that frequency effects do not occur in tasks other than lexical decision and word identification. 
If intentional history is an inherent part of the stimulus representation, intention-specific frequency or 
probability effects should be reliably detected as long as the task that is used to measure repetition 
priming matches the intentional history invoked by the study task. Intention-specific frequency or 
probability effects derive directly from the episodic nature of frequency effects. It is also a natural 
extension of the transfer-appropriate processing principle of memory (Bransford et al., 1979; Morris et al., 
1977). 
In accordance with the transfer-appropriate processing principle, studies on semantic judgments 
(e.g. making beautiful/ugly judgment on the meanings of words) have shown that learning as indexed by 
the amount of repetition priming is contingent on the similarity between acquisition and test task 
processes (Franks, Bilbrey, Lien, & McNamara, 2000; Thompson-Schill & Gabrieli, 1999; Vriezen, 
Moscovitch, & Bellos, 1995; Xiong, Franks, & Logan, 2003). Xiong et al. determined the degree of 
similarity between semantic judgments from the semantic differential approach (Osgood, Suci, & 
Tannenbaum, 1957). According to Osgood et al., the meanings of words are represented along a limited 
number of semantic dimensions such as the evaluative, potency, and activity dimensions. Bipolar 
adjective terms such as beautiful/ugly represent a straight line in semantic space and can function as a 
“semantic scale” against which the meanings of words are measured. Xiong et al. based their semantic 
judgment tasks on semantic scales.  Semantic judgment tasks were considered similar, that is, to share 
overlapping processes, if the corresponding semantic scales should elicit processing on the same semantic 
dimension(s). Semantic judgments were regarded as dissimilar if the corresponding semantic scales 
should elicit processing on orthogonal semantic dimensions. Subjects performed a semantic judgment 
task on a set of words at the study phase. They then performed the same, a similar, or a dissimilar 
judgment on these set of words as well as a new set of words at test. Repetition priming was defined as 
the difference in reaction times (RTs) to the old and new sets of words at test. Repetition priming was at a 
maximum level when the study and test judgments were the same, intermediate when the study and test 
judgments were similar, and negligible when the study and test judgments were dissimilar from each 
other. 
Vriezen et al. (1995) and Thompson-Schill and Gabrieli (1999) took a different approach to 
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similarity relations in semantic judgments and found similar patterns of results. They postulated that 
semantic information on objects might be organized according to domain-specific attributes (e.g., 
structural/visual or functional). Semantic judgments were considered similar if they accessed the same 
semantic domain. Both studies reported significant repetition priming between study and test judgments 
that accessed the same semantic domain, and little or no repetition priming when the study and test 
judgments tapped into different semantic domains. 
In the above mentioned studies (Vriezen et al., 1995; Thompson-Schill & Gabrieli, 1999; Xiong 
et al., 2003), little or no repetition priming at all was detected when the study and test judgment tasks 
were dissimilar, even though identical stimulus items were involved. The lack of transfer between 
dissimilar study and test tasks indicates that distinctive task processes involving the same item do not 
aggregate. Results from these studies suggest that intention is an inherent part of the memory instances 
involving the stimulus (Logan, 1988). The cumulative effect of such intention-specific instances, then, 
should also be intention-specific. 
 
Word Frequency Effects in Explicit Memory Tasks 
Word frequency effects are also reported in recognition tasks. After having been presented in a 
study phase, low frequency words are better recognized than high frequency words (e.g. Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996). The dual process model of word recognition suggests that people 
recognize words by familiarity as well as direct retrieval of the target words (e.g. Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 
1980). Familiarity is assumed to be based on perceptual fluency, that is, the ease which people can 
perceive the target (Jacoby), or the degree of interitem integration, which is the integration of an event 
independent of its relation to other events (Mandler). Direct retrieval, on the other hand, involves 
retrieving the contextual details of the original study episode. Word frequency effects in recognition may 
be explained in terms of familiarity by assuming that people are sensitive to the absolute levels of 
familiarity as well as the increment in familiarity with recent exposure. The finding that low frequency 
words show more repetition priming than high frequency words has been taken as evidence for the 
familiarity based account of word frequency effects in recognition (Jacoby, Mandler). However, 
presuming that subjects can distinguish between items that they actually “remember” as being in the study 
list versus items that they “know” to be in the study list based on familiarity, a number of studies 
concluded that word frequency effects in recognition arise from the direct retrieval process, because word 
frequencies only affected the “remembered” items (Gardiner & Java, 1990; Guttentag & Carroll, 1997; 
Kinoshita, 1995). 
With respect to word frequency effects in free recall tasks, two different patterns have emerged 
depending on the experimental design. When high and low frequency words are presented in separate lists 
during study, often with a between subject design, high frequency word are more likely to be recalled 
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than low frequency words (see Gregg, 1976, for a review). When high and low frequency words are 
mixed in the same study list, the recall advantage for high frequency words disappears, or sometimes low 
frequency words are more readily recalled than high frequency words (Duncan, 1974; Gregg, 
Montgomery, & Castaño, 1980; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996). The retrieve-recognize model of recall 
(Kintsch, 1970, as cited by Gregg, 1976) suggests that recall starts with a retrieval process in which 
potential responses are generated, followed by a recognition process whereby subjects decide which of 
the potential responses are appropriate. The retrieve-recognize model suggests that high frequency words 
are better recalled than low frequency words because they are more likely to be generated than low 
frequency words. However, the retrieve-recognize model runs into difficulty when attempting to explain 
the absence of advantage for high frequency words in mixed list conditions. 
Regardless of what mechanisms give rise to word frequency effects in recognition and recall 
tasks, what is most relevant for the present work is the consensus that word frequency effects in 
recognition and recall reflect episodic memory retrieval effects. Word recognition and free recall tasks 
rely on subjects’ remembering the study episodes. These tasks should therefore be the exemplar cases for 
demonstrating intention specificity. In fact, task-specificity, or, intention-specificity, in explicit memory 
tasks has long since been documented and led to the proposal of the transfer-appropriate processing 
principle (Bransford et al., 1979; Morris et al., 1977), as well as the encoding-specificity principle of 
memory (Tulving, 1979; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Morris et al. engaged subjects in either a semantic 
acquisition or a rhyme acquisition task in the study phase. Semantic acquisition led to superior 
performance than rhyme acquisition in a standard recognition test. However, rhyme acquisition led to 
better performance than semantic acquisition in a rhyming recognition test. Tulving and Thomson 
presented subjects target words to study in the context of weakly associated words (e.g. ground-COLD). 
Subjects recalled many more words at test when they were given the original weak associates as retrieval 
cues than when they were provided strong associates of the target words (e.g. hot-COLD) that were not 
presented in the study phase as retrieval cues. Given these results, intention-specific frequency effects in 
recognition and recall tasks should be expected. 
 
Assessing the Intentional History of Words 
The above discussion shows that both explicit and implicit memory tasks exhibit intention-
specific learning effects. The type of task subjects perform on a word at the study phase has direct impact 
on their memory for the stimulus as assessed by repetition priming (Franks et al., 2000; Thompson-Schill 
& Gabrieli, 1999; Vriezen et al., 1995; Xiong et al., 2003), recognition (Bransford et al., 1979; Morris et 
al., 1977), and recall tasks (Tulving, 1979; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). This suggests that intention is an 
inherent part of the memory instances involving the stimulus (Logan, 1988). The cumulative effect of 
such intention-specific instances should also be intention-specific. 
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To examine the cumulative effect of intention-specific instances on memory for word stimuli, that 
is, the effect of the intentional history of words on memory for word stimuli, the present work invoked 
particular aspects of a word’s intentional history by a semantic judgment task at study, and assessed 
subjects’ memory for words in the study phase with repetition priming, recognition, or free recall tasks at 
test. The intentional history of words with respect to the study judgment task was determined, and its 
effects compared with those of word frequencies. 
The present work estimated the intentional history of words with respect to semantic judgments 
by the text context the word stimuli have appeared in. For example, the frequency with which the word 
dream has appeared in the context of beautiful or ugly is presumably proportional to how often dream has 
been judged in terms of beautiful/ugly. This leads to two measures of the intentional history of words—
the frequency and the probability with which a judgment has been made on words. These two measures 
are dissociable because there are situations in which the absolute frequency of a judgment being 
performed on a word is relatively high, but the probability of making the judgment is relatively low (e.g., 
making beautiful/ugly judgment on the word desk), and situations where the absolute frequency of 
performing the judgment is low, but the probability of making the judgment is high (e.g., making 
beautiful/ugly judgment on the word tiara). 
Subject ratings 
As a first attempt at quantifying the intentional history of words, I had subjects rate how often 
they had thought of a word in terms of a semantic scale, and then re-analyzed repetition priming data in 
Xiong et al. (2003) for task-specific frequency effects. There was significantly more repetition priming 
for words that received low task-specific frequency ratings than for words that had high task-specific 
frequency ratings. Meanwhile no difference in repetition priming was observed if the words were divided 
into subsets with high versus low word frequency (Kučera & Francis, 1967), or subsets with high versus 
low word familiarity (Gilhooly & Logie, 1981). Details of these analyses are reported in Chapter 2. 
Googling 
Instead of having subjects rate the frequency and probability of a judgment being performed on 
words, the present set of experiments relied on the co-occurrences of words in a text corpus for more 
objective measures of the frequency and probability with which a judgment has been performed on words. 
Objective measures based on co-occurrences of words are favored for two reasons: 1) it is not clear how 
well subjects can discriminate and give independent frequency and probability ratings; 2) ultimately, we 
would prefer to relate human behavior to environmental variables rather than subjective variables. 
The number of co-occurrences of a semantic scale and a stimulus item in a proper text corpus 
presumably reflects the frequency with which the judgment has been made in the context of that item. Co-
occurrences of words in text corpora have been used to develop computational models of language and 
memory (Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Lund & Burgess, 1996). These models were able to account for 
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large amounts of data on language learning and memory despite their seemingly very gross measuring 
methods for word co-occurrences. For instance, the HAL (hyperspace analogue to language; Lund & 
Burgess) model counted co-occurrences of words in a 10-word sliding window, irrespective of any 
sentential structure. Such co-occurrence counts still had sufficient signal-to-noise ratio to give rise to a 
highly functional model of semantic memory. 
The Internet is the largest, most general, and most up-to-date text corpus. The Google search 
engine provides a ready way to gather co-occurrence as well as stand-alone frequency counts of words on 
the Internet. When a semantic scale term and a word are entered for Google to search, for example, 
beautiful dream, the estimated number of results returned by Google represents the number of text 
samples in which the word beautiful and dream have appeared together, which is, in turn, presumed to 
correlate with the frequency of the beautiful judgment being made on the word dream. 
For the present set of experiments, the frequency with which a semantic judgment has been 
performed on a word, for instance, the frequency with which a beautiful/ugly judgment has been made on 
the word dream, is calculated by adding up the estimated number of search results returned by Google for 
beautiful dream and ugly dream. For convenience’s sake, this task-specific frequency value is labeled 
Fscale.word, capturing the fact that task-specific frequency is defined by the frequency of the semantic scale 
(which represents the semantic judgment task) and the word appearing together. In line with this 
denotation, the frequency of the word itself is labeled Fword. The probability of making a beautiful/ugly 
judgment given the word dream is determined by dividing the frequency of beautiful/ugly and dream 
appearing together by the frequency of the word dream itself. This task-specific probability value is 
labeled Pscale|word, Pscale|word = Fscale.word/Fword. In the case of a beautiful/ugly judgment on dream, the 
search for dream led to an estimate of 25,700,000 results, the search for beautiful dream produced an 
estimate of 4,970,000 results, and the search for ugly dream generated an estimate of 816,000 results 
(retrieved March 18, 2004). For the word dream, its word frequency Fword = 25,700,000, task-specific 
frequency Fscale.word = 4,970,000 + 816,000 = 5,786,000, and task-specific probability Pscale|word = 
5,786,000 / 25,700,000 = 0.23. 
I have no specific knowledge about what counts as one search result for Google, except the claim 
that Google considers the “the position and size of the search terms within the page, and the proximity of 
the search terms to one another” (Blachman, retrieved April 16, 2004). But whatever Google’s criteria 
are, they are consistent. Results from the present set of experiments have proven the Google approach to 
the intentional history of words to be extremely functional and efficient. 
Through the course of the current project, two sets of words were used for generating the word 
stimuli. The first set was the 1944 words from the Gilhooly and Logie (1980) norm of rated word 
familiarity. The second set included 2482 words from Kučera and Francis (1967), mostly nouns with 
some verbs and adjectives, evenly distributed across the alphabet. The second set was generated with the 
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help of MRC Psycholinguistic Database website (retrieved August 28, 2004). With the exception of 
Experiment 1, an automated search program based on the Google Web API (retrieved May 29, 2004) was 
used to perform the Google searches. The correlation between Google word frequencies retrieved three 
months apart (retrieved May and August, 2004) was 0.98, p < 0.001. The correlation between Google 
word frequencies and Gilhooly and Logie familiarity ratings was 0.38, p < 0.001. The correlation between 
Google word frequencies and Kučera and Francis word frequencies was 0.63, p < 0.001. As a reference 
point, the correlation between Gilhooly and Logie familiarity ratings and Kučera and Francis word 
frequencies was 0.47, p < 0.001. 
 
Overview of the Experiments 
 To address whether intention-specific frequency and probability information is inherent to a 
word’s representation and has specific influence on memory for the words, six experiments were 
conducted in the presented work. They compared the effects of the intentional history of words, 
operationalized as the Fscale.word and Pscale|word values, with the effects of word frequencies, Fword. The 
experiments also compared the effects of the two different measures of the intentional history of words 
with each other. To test whether intentional history is a general property of memory representations, both 
explicit and implicit memory tasks were used when assessing the memory for the words. 
 As suggested earlier, intention-specific frequency or probability effects are expected only if the 
task with which memory for the stimulus is measured matches the intentional history invoked by the 
study task. For repetition priming, use of the same task at test as used in the study phase should result in 
maximum effects. For recognition and recall, a cued procedure could be employed, in which subjects are 
instructed to use the task they have just performed in the study phase as a retrieval cue. However, I 
speculate that people naturally use intentional acts as retrieval cues for remembering things (how many 
times have you asked yourself “who have I told this joke to”?). Subjects will most likely use the study 
task as a retrieval cue for the recognition and recall tasks even without explicit cueing. The present work 
chose not to use explicit cueing but instead gave subjects standard recognition and free recall instructions 
(e.g., respond old to words that have been presented in the previous block). This might cause the 
intention-specific frequency or probability effects to be weaker because subjects might not always think 
about the task they have just done, so the results would be a mixture of cued and uncued performance. 
But, with standard recognition and free recall instructions, the experiments can afford more 
generalizability, which is important if we wish to generalize the results to word frequency effects in 
previous studies. 
In all experiments to be reported here, the study phases involved making semantic judgments on 
the meanings of words. The study task should invoke a particular aspect of the intentional history of 
words with respect to the judgment task. The test phases of Experiment 1 and 2 repeated the same 
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semantic judgment task on words as in the study phase. Repetition priming for items with high and low 
Fword, Fscale.word and Pscale|word values with respect to the study judgment task was compared. Experiment 
3 and 4 measured subjects’ sensitivity in distinguishing between old and new items in recognition tests. 
Recognition sensitivities for items with high and low Fword, Fscale.word and Pscale|word values were 
compared. Finally, Experiment 5 and 6 focused on the effects of Fscale.word and Pscale|word in free recall 
tests, with mixed and separate list designs, respectively. 
The primary goal of the present work is to establish intentional history as part of a word’s 
representation instead of simple word frequency. This entails re-attributing the effects of word 
frequencies with regard to memory task performances to intentional history. Therefore, one, or both 
measures of the intentional history of words, Fscale.word and Pscale|word, should reproduce the traditional 
word frequency effect pattern in memory tasks. For all the experiments, the intentional history hypothesis 
predicts intention-specific frequency or probability effects analogous to traditional word frequency 
effects, but not word frequency effects themselves. Results like these would suggest intentional history to 
be part of the stimulus representation, but not stimulus frequency information independent of acquisition 
intentions. 
It is also likely that two measure of the intentional history of words, Fscale.word and Pscale|word, 
should have differential impact on explicit and implicit memory tasks. If this is the case, it will indicate 
that explicit and implicit memory processes integrate information differently, thus supporting the 
proposition of multiple memory systems. On the other hand, if Fscale.word and Pscale|word affects explicit 





INTENTION-SPECIFIC FREQUENCY EFFECT IN XIONG ET AL. (2003) DATA 
 
Studies on word frequency effects in repetition priming have produced mixed results. Studies 
using lexical decision and word identification tasks have generally reported more repetition priming for 
low frequency words than high frequency words (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Hayman, 1987; 
Kirsner et al., 1986; Scarborough et al., 1977). However, studies using word stem or fragment completion 
tasks have not always found greater facilitation for low frequency words (for a review, see Roediger & 
McDermott, 1993). The present work suggests that learning and memory is specific to the intentional acts 
at stimulus acquisition, the frequency information in stimulus representation should be specific to the 
frequency of the acquisition acts involving the stimulus, rather than frequency of the stimulus 
independent of acquisition acts. To test this hypothesis, this study collected intention-specific frequency 
ratings on words from subjects and analyzed the amount of repetition priming with respect to intention-
specific frequency ratings in the same-transfer conditions in the Xiong et al. (2003) study. 
Eight experiments in Xiong et al. (2003) included same-transfer conditions, that is, conditions in 
which the study and test semantic judgment tasks were repeated. Judgments in these experiments were 
based on six different semantic scales. Subjects in the current study rated how frequently they had thought 
of a word’s meaning with respect to the semantic scales (e.g. fast/slow) when they had seen or heard the 
word. The rating is labeled Fscale|word, rather than Fscale.word, because subjects gave estimates of the 
relative frequency of a judgment task being performed when they had encountered a word, instead of the 
absolute frequency of performing the judgment on the word. If frequency effects in repetition priming are 
specific to the intentional acts at past stimulus acquisitions, we would expect words with low Fscale|word 
ratings with respect to a judgment to show more repetition priming in the judgment task than words with 




Eighteen Vanderbilt undergraduate students participated for experimental credits for courses. All 
subjects were native speakers of English. They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All subjects 
signed a consent form for participation. 
Tasks and stimuli 
Six semantic judgment tasks were used in the Xiong et al. (2003) study. They were based on the 
semantic scales of active/passive, fast/slow, pleasant/unpleasant, strong/weak, valuable/worthless, and 
young/old (Osgood et al., 1957). Subjects’ task in the current study was to rate how often they had 
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thought of a word’s meaning in terms of these semantic scales. A subset of 130 words was selected from 
the words used in the Xiong et al. study. The words ranged from four to eight letters in length. The mean 
word frequency was 177 per million, SD = 156 (Kučera & Francis, 1967). 
Procedure 
Subjects rated how often they had thought about a word’s meaning in terms of a semantic scale 
when they had seen or heard the word. A five-point rating scheme was used. A rating of one indicated 
that the subject had very rarely considered the word’s meaning in terms of the semantic scale. A rating of 
five suggested that the subject had very frequently thought of the word in terms of the scale. 
Figure 1. An example trial for the Fscale|word rating. 
 
Instructions for the subjects included examples. Subjects performed six blocks of semantic scale 
ratings, one for each scale. The order of the blocks was Latin-square counterbalanced. There were 130 
trials in each block. Subjects initiated the blocks. The leading question and reminder of the rating scheme 
remained on screen throughout a block. The semantic scale being rated was presented in upper case font 
at the end of the leading question. Figure 1 illustrated what a trial looked like. On each trial, a word was 
presented in lower case font in between the two lines of the leading question. Subjects responded by 
pressing the “h”, “j”, “k”, “l”, and “;” keys, which were labeled with the ratings of 1 through 5. The rating 
that a subject had just given was shown after the leading question for 300 ms before the word and the 
rating both disappeared. The next trial started 500 ms later with the presentation of a new word. It took a 
subject anywhere between 40 to 60 minutes to finish. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Mean frequency ratings were calculated for each semantic scale and word combination, 
collapsing across subjects. There were altogether 6 (scale) × 130 (word) mean frequency ratings. The 
mean frequency rating and standard deviation for each scale, collapsing across words and subjects, are 
listed in Table 1. Given the relative frequency rating scale ranged from 1 to 5 from least frequent to most 
frequent, for every semantic scale, words that received mean frequency ratings of 3 or higher were 
assigned to the high Fscale|word rating list. Words that received mean frequency ratings less than 3 were 
When you have seen or heard the word 
                                                  airplane 
how often have you thought of its meaning in terms of FAST/SLOW?   5 
1=very rarely  2=rarely  3=sometimes  4=frequently  5=very frequently 
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assigned to the low Fscale|word rating list. Table 1 contains the number of words that were assigned to 
each list. 
There were eight experiments in Xiong et al. (2003) that involved the same 2 (test judgment, 
same or different) × 2 (item type, old or new) design. In that work, subjects performed a semantic 
judgment, for example, pleasant/unpleasant judgment, on 40 unique words during study. They were then 
tested on the same judgment (same-transfer condition) as well as a different judgment task (cross-transfer 
condition) on words. The same versus different judgment task conditions were blocked. Half of the words 
for each test judgment were old items from the study phase, half of them were new. Repetition priming 
was calculated as the difference between RTs to old and new items at test. Same-transfer conditions 
produced the greatest amounts of repetition priming. The current study focused on intention-specific 
frequency effects in same-transfer conditions. 
 
Table 1. Mean Fscale|word Ratings and the Number of Words in High versus Low Fscale|word rating 
lists  
Semantic scale M SD high low
active/passive 2.21 0.07 24 106
fast/slow 2.11 0.08 25 105
pleasant/unpleasant 2.90 0.08 53 77
strong/weak 2.52 0.07 36 94
valuable/worthless 2.61 0.07 47 83
young/old 2.08 0.07 22 108
Mean frequency rating F scale |word  list
 
 
RTs in the eight same-transfer conditions (Xiong et al., 2003) were sorted depending on whether 
they were RTs to words in the high versus low Fscale|word rating list with respect to the semantic 
judgment task. RTs to both high and low Fscale|word rating words were then sorted again according to the 
old/new status of the words. As can be seen from Table 1, there are much fewer words with high 
Fscale|word than low Fscale|word ratings. This led to an average of only five observations from each subject 
in the high Fscale|word rating cells, and approximately 12 observations in the low Fscale|word rating cells. 
The following analyses were thus collapsed across all semantic-transfer conditions. 
Subjects’ mean RTs at test were analyzed with a 2 (Fscale|word, high or low) × 2 (item type, old or 
new) repeated measures ANOVA. Means for the ANOVA are displayed in Figure 2. Items with high 
Fscale|word ratings were responded to 119 ms quicker than items with low Fscale|word ratings. Old items 
were responded to 128 ms faster than new items at test. Both the main effects of Fscale|word and item type 
were significant, F(1,255)’s = 49.09 and 52.55, p’s < 0.001, and partial eta square η2’s = 0.16 and 0.17, 
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respectively. More critically, consistent with the task-specific learning hypothesis, old items with low 
Fscale|word ratings showed 102 ms more repetition priming than old items with high Fscale|word ratings. 
The interaction between Fscale|word and old new item type was highly reliable, F(1,255) = 11.40, p = 0.001, 





















Figure 2. Mean reaction times for items with high versus low intention-specific frequency 
(Fscale|word) ratings. Error bars represent stand error from the ANOVA. 
 
To show that the frequency effects were specific to the semantic judgment tasks, rather than a 
general effect of word frequency or word familiarity, the same analysis was repeated with word frequency 
(Kučera & Francis, 1967) and with word familiarity ratings (Gilhooly & Logie, 1980). For the word 
frequency analysis, test RTs in same-transfer conditions were sorted into high word frequency (M = 376 
per million, SD = 189) versus low word frequency (M = 31 per million, SD = 17) halves. The amount of 
repetition priming did not differ between high and low frequency words. No interaction between word 
frequency and old new item type was observed, F(1,255) < 1, ns.  Similarly, when test RTs in same-transfer 
conditions were sorted according to high versus low word familiarity ratings (M = 6.32 and 5.45, SD = 
0.27 and 0.38, respectively), no difference in repetition priming was detected between words with high 
versus low familiarity ratings, F(1,255) < 1, ns. Repetition priming in semantic judgments was not affected 
by word frequency or familiarity ratings. Frequency effects in repetition priming were specific to the 







Word frequency effects (more repetition priming for low frequency words than for high 
frequency words) have been reported in repetition priming studies, albeit inconsistently (for a review, see 
Roediger & McDermott, 1993). The present study hypothesized that intentional history is an inherent part 
of stimulus representation, and that frequency effects should be specific to the frequency of the intentional 
acts involving the stimulus at past acquisitions, rather than frequency of the stimulus in the environment. 
The post hoc study on data from Xiong et al. (2003) supported this hypothesis. However, the intention-
specific frequency measure in the post hoc study (Fscale|word) confounded the frequency and the 
probability of a judgment being performed on words. To go beyond that, the present set of experiments 
relied on word co-occurrence counts from Google searches to measure the frequency and probability of a 
judgment being performed on words. This afforded us the opportunity to disambiguate the effects of 
intention-specific frequency (Fscale.word) and intention-specific probability (Pscale|word) on learning and 
memory. 
Experiment 1 examined the effects of intention-specific frequency and intention-specific 
probability on repetition priming with a 2 (Fscale.word, high versus low) × 2 (Pscale|word, high versus low) × 
2 (item type, old versus new) within-subject design. If frequency effects in repetition priming are specific 
to the frequency of past acquisition acts, we should expect more repetition priming for words with low 
Fscale.word values than for words with high Fscale.word values, but there might not necessarily be more 




Twenty-four Vanderbilt undergraduate students participated in the experiment for experimental 
credits for courses. All subjects were native speakers of English. They had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. All subjects signed a consent form for participation. Data from one subject were replaced due to 
extremely long RTs (more than 2.5 SD away from mean RTs for all subjects). 
Tasks and stimuli 
The study and test tasks involved making beautiful/ugly judgments on the meanings of words. A 
total of 104 nouns were used, 96 of which were experimental items. Experimental items included four 
equal subsets of words in accordance with the factorial combination of high versus low Fscale.word and 
Pscale|word values with respect to beautiful/ugly judgments. The average Fscale.word and Pscale|word values 
for each subset of words are listed in Table 2. The average word frequencies (Fword) are also included for 
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reference. Efforts were made to equate the numbers of items that could be judged beautiful versus ugly for 
each subset of words. 
 
Table 2. Average word frequency (Fword), intention-specific frequency (Fscale.word), intention-specific 
probability (Pscale|word), and repetition priming (RP) for Experiment 1 word subsets.  
subset F word F scale.word P scale |word RP (ms)
1 13,224,167   2,862,892 0.23 89
2 154,025,000 4,474,792 0.04 86
3 975,625        222,466 0.24 120
4 3,707,836     124,753 0.04 133  
 
Procedures 
During the study phase, subjects performed beautiful/ugly judgment on 48 experimental items, 12 
from each of the four subsets. After a 30-sec non-filled break, subjects initiated the test phase. The test 
phase involved making the same judgment on all the old items from the acquisition, as well as 48 new 
items. There were four filler trials at the beginning of both the study and test phases. Presentation order of 
items was randomized for each subject. The counterbalanced factors were: old versus new item sets, the 
left-right hand assignment of beautiful and ugly responses, and whether the test phase had the same 
response mapping as acquisition or not. 
Subjects were tested individually. Task instructions and materials were presented on 8088 
personal computers in 80-column lowercase font, in the default display color of green or orange. Each 
letter was about 2.5 × 2.5mm or 2.5 × 5mm (with extender) in size. The instructions included examples 
and stated that there was no right or wrong answer in the judgments. Subjects were asked to respond as 
soon as they had the impression of the meaning of words with regard to the judgment instead of spending 
a lot of time thinking. Subjects read the instructions and were then presented words one at a time. A 
reminder for hand response mapping remained on the screen throughout the blocks. Subjects indicated 
different responses by pressing the “z” or "/?" key on the keyboard. 
Each trial started with a ready signal (*) that appeared in the middle of the screen for 500 ms. It 
was followed by the presentation of a word which remained on the screen until the subject responded. The 
interval from the previous trial response to the next ready signal was 500 ms. The presentation order, 
response type, and RT were recorded for experimental items. 
 
Results and Discussion 
All RTs from the test phase were entered into the analyses for there were no absolute right or 
wrong answers to beautiful/ugly judgments. Median RTs from each subject were used instead of mean 
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RTs because the RT distributions in the semantic judgments tended to be skewed towards long RTs. The 
median RTs were analyzed with a 2 (Fscale.word, high versus low) × 2 (Pscale|word, high versus low) × 2 





























Figure 3. Mean reaction times for items with high versus low intention-specific frequency (Fscale.word) 
and high versus low intention-specific probability (Pscale|word). Error bars stand for stand error 
from the ANOVA. 
 
Words with a high probability of being judged in terms of beautiful/ugly, that is, words with high 
Pscale|word values, were responded to 121 ms faster than words with low Pscale|word values. Old items 
were responded to 107 ms quicker than new items at test. The main effects of Pscale|word and item type 
were highly significant, F(1,23)’s = 20.31 and 44.18, p’s < 0.001, η2’s (partial eta squares) = 0.47 and 0.66. 
More importantly, consistent with the task-specific learning hypothesis, words with low Fscale.word values 
received 39 ms more repetition priming than words with high Fscale.word values. The interaction between 
Fscale.word and old new item type was significant, F(1,23) = 4.22, p = 0.05, η2 = 0.16. In contrast, the amount 
of repetition priming did not differ between words with low Pscale|word values and words with high 
Pscale|word values, F(1,23) < 1, ns. No three way interaction between the factors was observed, F(1,23) < 1, ns. 
Because there was no absolute right or wrong answer in the judgment task, response consistency 
was analyzed as an indicator of response validity (Xiong et al., 2003). If an item received the same 
beautiful or ugly response in the test phase as in acquisition, response to that item was deemed consistent. 
Percentage consistency rates for old items at test were analyzed with a 2 (Fscale.word, high versus low) × 2 
(Pscale|word, high versus low) × 2 (response type, beautiful versus ugly) repeated measures ANOVA. The 
only significant effect was the main effect of Pscale|word, F(1,22) = 13.16, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.37. There were a 
greater proportion of consistent responses for old words with high Pscale|word values than for old words 
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with low Pscale|word values, 93% and 87%, respectively. The relatively high consistency rate, even for 
items with low Pscale|word values, suggested good response validity despite the sometimes odd judgments 
(imagine making beautiful/ugly judgment on membrane). The fact that consistency rates did not differ 
statistically between old words with high Fscale.word values and old words with low Fscale.word values 
excluded response consistency as a potential confounding factor behind the Fscale.word effect in repetition 
priming. 
One concern with Experiment 1 is that both the Fscale.word and Pscale|word values were confounded 
with word frequency, Fword (see Table 2 for detailed values). However, while both Fscale.word and Pscale|word 
values for the word subsets co-varied with Fword values, they exhibited completely independent influences 
on RT and repetition priming. This implies that Fword could not have been responsible for the whole 
pattern of results in this experiment. While it is very unlikely that the main effect of Pscale|word on RT was 
due to Fword (high Pscale|word value items, while having low Fword values, led to much quicker responses), 
it is nonetheless possible that the Fscale.word effect was in fact an Fword effect. 
A linear regression analysis was therefore performed, with repetition priming as the dependent 
variable, and Fword, Fscale.word, and Pscale|word as the predictor variables. Repetition priming was calculated 
for each word, collapsing across subjects. Repetition priming was calculated as RTacq − RTold rather than 
RTnew − RTold because the latter comparison was between subjects (Repetition priming, when calculated 
as RTacq − RTold, yielded identical pattern of results as the above ANOVA). The regression analysis used 
the backward variable elimination method. The two variables that remained in the regression analysis 
were Fscale.word and Pscale|word, with R2 = 0.09, F(2,93) = 4.64, p = 0.01. The standardized coefficients (β’s) 
for Fscale.word and Pscale|word were -.28 and -.17, t’s = -2.80 and -1.71, p’s = 0.006 and 0.09. This indicated 
that it was indeed the intention-specific frequency, Fscale.word, instead of Fword that was driving the 
frequency effect. 
In summary, Experiment 1 showed that learning as indexed by the amount of repetition priming 
was specific to the acquisition intentional act involving the word stimulus. Furthermore, Experiment 1 
demonstrated that the effects of Fscale.word and Pscale|word on semantic judgments were dissociable. While 
Fscale.word affected the amount of repetition priming, Pscale|word had large impact on semantic judgment 
RTs. It is likely that Fscale.word and Pscale|word should have dissociable influences in other types of memory 






The regression analysis in Experiment 1 implied that it was intention-specific frequency 
(Fscale.word) rather than word frequency (Fword) that gave rise to the frequency effect. Experiment 2 directly 
tested the effects of Fscale.word and Fword by varying the Fscale.word and Fword values of words factorially. A 
strong intentional history approach would argue that all instances are encoded with their specific 
intention, and that intention-free representations of objects do not exist. It would predict the amount of 
learning to be a function of the frequency of the intentional act involving the stimulus at past acquisitions 
rather than the frequency of the stimulus. This position would be supported if there was more repetition 
priming for items with low Fscale.word values than for items with high Fscale.word values, and at the same time 
there was the same amount of repetition priming for items with high Fword values as for items with low 
Fword values. A weaker position would acknowledge intention-specific as well as more abstract 
representations of objects. The weaker position should be adopted if the amount of repetition priming 





Thirty-two Vanderbilt undergraduate students participated in the experiment for experimental 
credits for courses. All subjects had English as their native language and normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. All subjects signed a consent form for participation. Data from two subjects with extremely long 
RTs (more than 2.5 SDs away from the mean RT across all subjects) were replaced. 
Tasks and stimuli 
As in Experiment 1, both the study and test phases involved making beautiful/ugly judgments on 
the meanings of words. There were altogether eight filler items and 144 experimental items in this 
experiment. Experimental items included four equal subsets of words in accordance with the factorial 
combination of high versus low Fscale.word values with respect to beautiful/ugly judgments and high versus 
low Fword values. The average Fscale.word and Fword values for the word subsets are listed in Table 3. The 
average task-specific probabilities (Pscale|word) are also included in Table 3 for reference. Efforts were 
made to equate the numbers of items that could be judged beautiful versus ugly for each subset of words. 
Procedures 
The experimental procedures remained the same as in Experiment 1. 
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Table 3. Average word frequency (Fword), intention-specific frequency (Fscale.word), intention-specific 
probability (Pscale|word), and repetition priming (RP) for Experiment 2 word subsets.  
subset F word F scale.word P scale |word RP (ms)
1 2,625,556 214,497 0.10 156
2 2,809,167 68,359 0.03 205
3 832,944 200,864 0.24 108
4 772,139 67,240 0.10 242  
 
Results and Discussion 
All RTs from the test phase were included in the analyses. A 2 (Fscale.word, high versus low) × 2 
(Fword, high versus low) × 2 (item type, old versus new) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on 
subjects’ median RTs. Figure 4 displays the means from the ANOVA. Items with high Fscale.word values 
were responded to 126 ms faster than items with low Fscale.word values, F(1,31) = 23.57, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.43. 
Items with high Fword values were responded to 97 ms slower than words with low Fword values, F(1,31) = 
13.23, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.30. Old items were responded to 178 ms faster than new items at test, F(1,31) = 
25.15, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.45. More critically, items with low Fscale.word values received 91 ms more 
repetition priming than items with high Fscale.word values. This interaction between Fscale.word and old new 
item type was statistically reliable, F(1,31) = 5.33, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.15. In contrast, repetition priming did 
not differ between items with high versus low Fword values. No interaction between Fword and old new item 
type was indicated, F(1,31) < 1, ns. The three way interaction between Fscale.word, Fword, and item type 
approached significance, F(1,31) = 4.20, p = 0.05, η2 = 0.12. 
As a measure of response validity, the percentages of old items that had received the same 
response at study and test were analyzed with a 2 (Fscale.word, high versus low) × 2 (Pscale|word, high versus 
low) × 2 (response type, beautiful versus ugly) repeated measures ANOVA. Words with high Fscale.word 
values generated a greater proportion of consistent responses than words with low Fscale.word values, 87% 
and 83%, respectively, F(1,29) = 4.57, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.14. No other effects were significant. 
The difference in response consistency rates between words with high versus low Fscale.word values 
could not have been responsible for the different amounts of repetition priming between words with high 
versus low Fscale.word values. In this experiment, consistent responses were made over 300 ms faster than 
inconsistent responses (812 versus 1154 ms). With a greater proportion of consistent responses, old items 
with high Fscale.word values should have a shorter average RT than old items with low Fscale.word values. 
When compared to RTs for new items, old items with high Fscale.word values should have shown more, 
instead of less, repetition priming than old items with low Fscale.word values. That is, if consistency rates 
had had any impact on repetition priming in this experiment, we should have observed an Fscale.word effect 
opposite to what was shown in the results. 
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A linear regression analysis as in Experiment 1 was performed, with repetition priming as the 
dependent variable, and Fword, Fscale.word, and Pscale|word as the predictor variables. Repetition priming was 
calculated as RTacq − RTold for each word, collapsing across subjects. The regression analysis used the 
backward variable elimination method. The only variable that remained in the regression analysis were 
Fscale.word, with R2 = 0.08, F(1,142) = 11.76, p = 0.001. The standardized coefficient (β) for Fscale.word was -.28, 
t = -3.43, p = 0.001. This supported the hypothesis that intention-specific frequency rather than word 






























Figure 4. Mean reaction times for items with high versus low intention-specific frequency (Fscale.word) 
and high versus low word frequency (Fword). Error bars stand for stand error from the ANOVA. 
 
Overall, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that repetition priming in semantic judgments varied 
as a function of Fscale.word, the frequency with which the intentional act under investigation had been 
performed on words. At the same time, Experiments 1 and 2 showed that repetition priming did not 
correlate with Fword, the word frequency in the environment. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that intentional history is part of a word’s representation but not word frequency independent 






Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that frequency effects in the repetition priming paradigm, a 
typical implicit memory measure, were intention-specific. Frequency effects have also been consistently 
found in recognition tests, a traditional explicit memory measure. After subjects studied a list of words, 
they could more accurately recognize low frequency words than high frequency words (Gillund & 
Shiffrin, 1984; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996). This experiment examined whether frequency effects in 
recognition tests were also specific to the intentional acts at past stimulus acquisitions. Like in 
Experiment 2, this experiment was designed to disentangle the effect of intention-specific frequency 
(Fscale.word) and word frequency (Fword) by varying them factorially. If explicit memory for words was 
intention-specific, we should expect subjects to be better at recognizing words with low Fscale.word values 
than word with high Fscale.word values, and yet not necessarily better at recognizing words with low Fword 




Twenty-four Vanderbilt undergraduate students participated in the experiment for experimental 
credits for courses. All subjects had English as their native language and normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. All subjects signed a consent form for participation. Data from one subject were replaced because 
of extremely low sensitivity in distinguishing old from new items (hit% − false alarm% < 0). 
Tasks and stimuli 
The study phase involved making strong/weak judgments on the meanings of words. In the test 
phase subjects decided whether words had been presented during acquisition or not. There were six filler 
items and 144 experimental items in the experiment. Experimental items included four equal subsets of 
words in accordance with the factorial combination of high versus low Fscale.word values with respect to 
strong/weak judgments and high versus low Fword values. Efforts were made to equate the numbers of 
items that could be judged strong versus judged weak for each subset of words. 
Procedures 
Subjects performed a block of strong/weak judgments on the meanings of words during study. 
They were instructed to respond as quickly as possible while avoiding errors when a word was presented. 
Subjects were not informed of the following recognition test. After four filler trials at the beginning of the 
acquisition, there were 72 experimental trials, 18 for each of the four subsets of words. There was a 30-
sec non-filled break between study and test phases. Subjects initiated the test phase when they were ready. 
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They were instructed to respond old to words that had been presented in the previous block and respond 
new to words that had not been presented. The first four trials in the test phase were filler trials. The rest 
144 trials included words from the study phase as well as 72 new words. All trials in the study and test 
phases started with a ready signal (*) that appeared in the middle of the screen for 500 ms. A word was 
then presented and remained on the screen until the subject responded by pressing the “z” or “?/” key. 
The interval from the previous trial response to the next ready signal was 500 ms. Presentation order of 
the experimental items was randomized for each subject. The counterbalanced factors were: old versus 
new item sets, the left-right hand assignment of strong and weak, and of old and new responses. 
 
Table 4. Average word frequency (Fword), intention-specific frequency (Fscale.word), intention-specific 
probability (Pscale|word), study phase RT, and recognition performance (d') for Experiment 3 word 
subsets. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors from the ANOVA.  
subset F word F scale.word P scale |word RTstudy (ms) d'
1 3,368,611 449,731 0.13 1026(38) 2.43
2 3,310,278 189,308 0.06  885(38) 2.49
3 1,262,056 415,306 0.33  969(38) 1.86
4 1,207,389 172,428 0.14 1035(38) 2.32  
 
Results and Discussion 
Recognition performance was measured by subjects’ sensitivity in distinguishing old from new 
items. Table 4 lists the d's (Zhit – Zfalse alarm) for the four subsets of words. The Z-scores for hits and false 
alarms were based on the percentage hit and false alarm rates averaged across subjects. Figure 6 shows 
subjects’ recognition sensitivity as calculated by hit% − false alarm%. A 2 (Fscale.word, high versus low) × 
2 (Fword, high versus low) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the latter sensitivity measure 
(See Figure 5). Words with low Fscale.word values were better recognized than words with high Fscale.word 
values, F(1,23) = 7.14, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.24. Words with high Fword values were better recognized than words 
with low Fword values, F(1,23) = 22.35, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.49. The interaction between Fscale.word and Fword was 
marginally significant, F(1,23) = 3.59, p = 0.07, η2 = 0.14. 
In order to see whether recognition performance was contingent on how long it took subjects to 
process different subsets of words, subjects’ median RTs in the study phase were analyzed with a 2 
(Fscale.word, high versus low) × 2 (Fword, high versus low) repeated measures ANOVA. Means for the 
ANOVA are shown in Table 4. The pattern of results did not correspond with subjects’ recognition 
performance on the four subsets of words. Words with high Fscale.word values were responded to slightly 
slower (37 ms) than words with low Fscale.word values, but the difference was only marginally significant, 
F(1,23) = 3.49, p = 0.08, η2 = 0.13. No main effect of Fword was observed, F(1,23) = 1.42, ns. The interaction 
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between Fscale.word and Fword was statistically significant, F(1,23) = 7.51, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.25. Such a pattern 
of results suggested that differences in recognition performance for the four subsets of words were not 




























Figure 5. Recognition sensitivity (hit% − false alarm%) for items with high versus low intention-
specific frequency (Fscale.word) and high versus low word frequency (Fword). Error bars stand for stand 
error from the ANOVA. 
 
The fact that words with high Fword values were much better recognized than words with low Fword 
values prompted an alternative interpretation for the observed recognition results. A highly significant 
word frequency effect was observed in this experiment, yet it was the exact opposite of traditional word 
frequency effects in recognition (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996). High frequency 
words had been traditionally associated with worse instead of better recognition performance than low 
frequency words. A plausible explanation is that Pscale|word, instead of Fword, led to the difference between 
high and low Fword value items. As shown in Table 4, words with high Fword values also had lower 
Pscale|word values. Rather than words with high Fword values being better recognized than words with low 
Fword values, it is arguable that low Pscale|word value items were better recognized than high Pscale|word 
value items. In fact, there was a perfect inverse relation between average Pscale|word values and d's (see 
Table 4) for the four subsets of words. Pscale|word might be the most important factor in determining word 
recognition performance. This speculation was tested with a linear regression analysis. 
The dependent variable of the linear regression analysis was the recognition sensitivity for each 
item, calculated as the percentage of times the item was corrected recognized as being old (hit) minus the 
percentage of times the item was incorrectly identified as being old (false alarm). Different subjects 
contributed to the percentages of hits and false alarms. The predictor variables were Fword, Fscale.word, and 
Pscale|word. The regression analysis used the backward variable elimination method. The only variable 
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that remained in the regression analysis were Pscale|word, with R2 = 0.09, F(1,142) = 13.54, p < 0.001. The 
standardized coefficient (β) for Pscale|word was -.30, t = -3.68, p < 0.001. This supported the hypothesis 







 Experiment 3 suggested that the probability with which a judgment had been performed on a 
word (Pscale|word) was the most important factor in determining how well the word could be recognized 
on a later occasion. However, Experiment 3 was not specifically designed to test the effect of Pscale|word 
on word recognition. Experiment 4 re-examined the findings of Experiment 3 by varying the Fscale.word and 
Pscale|word values of words factorially. Words with low Fscale.word or Pscale|word values were expected to be 




 Sixteen Vanderbilt undergraduates participated in the experiment for experimental credits for 
courses. They had English as their native language and normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All subjects 
signed a consent form for participation. Data from two subjects were replaced due to lack of sensitivity in 
distinguishing old from new items (hit% − false alarm% < 0). 
Tasks and Stimuli 
 The study task was a strong/weak judgment on the meanings of words. The test task was a 
recognition test on words presented during study. There were six filler items and 144 experimental items 
in the experiment. The experimental items consisted of four equal subsets of words in accordance with the 
factorial combination of high versus low Fscale.word values and high versus low Pscale|word values with 
respect to strong/weak judgments. Table 5 contains the average Fword, Fscale.word, and Pscale|word values for 
each subset of words. 
 
Table 5. Average word frequency (Fword), intention-specific frequency (Fscale.word), intention-specific 
probability (Pscale|word), study phase RT, and recognition performance (d') for Experiment 4 word 
subsets. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors from the ANOVA.  
subset F word F scale.word P scale |word RTstudy(ms) d'
1 2,265,833 617,417 0.28 1028(63) 2.14
2 6,956,667 662,378 0.10  800(63) 2.93
3 531,250 147,431 0.28  897(63) 2.61





 The experimental procedures remained identical to the procedures in Experiment 3. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Recognition performance was measured by subjects’ sensitivity in distinguishing old from new 
items. Table 5 includes the d's (Zhit – Zfalse alarm) for the four subsets of words. The Z-scores for hits and 
false alarms were based on the percentage hit and false alarm rates averaged across subjects. The d's did 
not correspond at all with the average Fword values. Figure 6 displays subjects’ recognition sensitivity as 
calculated by hit% − false alarm%. A 2 (Fscale.word, high versus low) × 2 (Pscale|word, high versus low) 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the percent sensitivity measure. Both Fscale.word and 
Pscale|word had significant main effects on subjects’ recognition performance, F(1,15)’s = 5.55 and 13.32, 
p’s < 0.05 and 0.01, η2’s = 0.27 and 0.47, respectively. Items with low Fscale.word or Pscale|word values were 
better recognized than items with high Fscale.word or Pscale|word values. This was congruent with past 
studies on word frequency effects in recognition, which had found low frequency words to be better 
recognized than high frequency words (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996). The 
interaction between Fscale.word and Pscale|word approached significance, F(1,15) = 3.43, p = 0.08, η2 = 0.19. 
The Pscale|word effect was smaller for words with low Fscale.word values than for words with high Fscale.word 
values. Given the high level of performance for words with low Pscale|word values, the interaction could 




























Figure 6. Recognition sensitivity (hit% - false alarm%) for items with high versus low intention-
specific frequency (Fscale.word) and intention-specific probability (Pscale|word). Error bars stand for 
stand error from the ANOVA. 
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As in Experiment 3, subjects’ word recognition performance did not depend on their RTs to the 
words at the study phase (see Table 5). Subjects’ median RTs in making strong/weak judgment on the 
four subsets of words were analyzed with an ANOVA. The resulting pattern was quite different from the 
pattern in the recognition test. Fscale.word had no impact on subjects’ median RTs, F(1,15) < 1, ns, whereas 
Pscale|word did. Items with high Pscale|word values were responded to 78 ms slower than items with low 
Pscale|word values, F(1,15) = 8.58, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.36. Closer examination shows that Pscale|word had 
opposite effects for items with high and low Fscale.word values—when the Fscale.word values were high, items 
with high Pscale|word values were responded to slower than items with low Pscale|word values; when the 
Fscale.word values were low, items with high Pscale|word values were actually responded to faster than items 
with low Pscale|word values. The interaction between Fscale.word and Pscale|word was significant, F(1,15) = 
5.68, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.28. 
A linear regression analysis also pointed to Pscale|word as the most important factor in word 
recognition. The linear regression analysis had the recognition sensitivity for an item as the dependent 
variable, which was calculated as the percentage of hits minus percentage of false alarms across subjects. 
The predictor variables were Fword, Fscale.word, and Pscale|word. The regression analysis used the backward 
variable elimination method. Like in Experiment 3, the only variable that remained in the regression 
analysis were Pscale|word, with R2 = 0.08, F(1,142) = 12.92, p < 0.001. The standardized coefficient (β) for 
Pscale|word was -.29, t = -3.59, p < 0.001. 
 In Experiment 3, the Pscale|word values of words were related to recognition performance for the 
words, with words having low Pscale|word values being better recognized than words having high 
Pscale|word values. While not designed to study the effect of Pscale|word, Experiment 3 nonetheless 
suggested that Pscale|word is the main factor affecting recognition task performance. Results from 
Experiment 4 supported this observation. Experiment 4 also found Fscale.word to have some effect on 
recognition performance, but to a much lesser degree than Pscale|word. Word frequencies seemingly had a 
large impact (although in the opposite direction from traditional word frequency effects) on recognition 
performance in Experiment 3. However, the regression analysis suggested that the seemingly word 
frequency effect was actually an intention-specific probability effect. In Experiment 4, when the 
Pscale|word values and Fword values were un-confounded, the relation between word frequency and 
recognition performance disappeared. Both Experiment 3 and 4 supported the hypothesis that intentional 







 Word frequency effects have also been found in free recall, a benchmark explicit memory test. 
Two patterns of word frequency effects have appeared in free recall, though, depending on the 
experimental procedures (Duncan, 1974; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Gregg, 1976; Gregg et al., 1980; 
MacLeod & Kampe, 1996). When high and low frequency words were presented in separate lists, 
typically with a between-subject design, high frequency words were more likely to be recalled than low 
frequency words. In contrast, when high and low frequency words were presented in a mixed list, the 
recall advantage for high frequency words disappeared, and low frequency words tended to be better 
recalled than high frequency words. Experiment 5 tested whether frequency effects in free recall was 
intention-specific with a mixed-list, within-subject design. If explicit memory for words was contingent 
on the intentional acts at past stimulus acquisitions, we should expect better recall performance for words 
with low intention-specific frequency and (or) intention-specific probability than for words with high 




 Thirty-two Vanderbilt undergraduates participated in the experiment for experimental credits for 
courses. They had English as their native language and normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All subjects 
signed a consent form for participation. 
Tasks and stimuli 
 The study task involved making a strong/weak judgment on the meanings of words. For the test 
task subjects were instructed to write down as many words from the study block as they could remember. 
There were 40 experimental items and four filler items in the experiment. The experimental items 
consisted of four equal subsets according to the factorial combination of high versus low Fscale.word and 
high versus low Pscale|word values. Table 6 listed the average Fscale.word and Pscale|word values for the 
subsets. The average word frequency, Fword, is also included for reference. 
Procedures 
Subjects performed a strong/weak judgment on the meanings of words at study. Subjects were 
asked to respond as quickly as possible while avoiding errors. They were not informed of a later recall 
test. There were two filler trials at the beginning of the study block and two filler trials at the end. Each 
trial started with a ready signal (*) that appeared in the middle of the screen for 500 ms. Then a word was 
presented and remained on the screen until the subject responded by pressing the “z” or “?/” key. The 
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interval from the previous trial response to the next ready signal was 500 ms. The presentation order of 
experimental items was randomized for each subject. The left-right hand mapping assignment for strong 
and weak responses was counterbalanced. There was a 30-sec non-filled break after the acquisition. 
Subjects initiated the test phase when they were ready. They were given ten minutes to write down on a 
piece of paper as many words from the study phase as they could remember. When ten minutes had 
passed, subjects were told that the experiment was over and they were debriefed. 
 
Table 6. Average word frequency (Fword), intention-specific frequency (Fscale·word), intention-specific 
probability (Pscale|word), study phase RT, and percentages of words recalled for Experiment 5 word 
subsets. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors from the ANOVAs.  
subset F word F scale.word P scale |word RTstudy (ms) % recalled
1 11,246,000 2,994,700 0.27 1066(23) 27(3)
2 16,714,545 2,456,818 0.15 1107(23) 34(3)
3 3,790,000 1,056,900 0.28 1132(23) 30(3)
4 9,423,000 1,085,820 0.12 1061(23) 33(3)  
 
Results and Discussion 
 For the free recall test, the exact reproduction, inaccurate spelling (e.g., “brethern” for brethren), 
and plural form of experimental items were counted as correct, but derivatives (e.g., “master” for 
mastery) and synonyms (e.g., “influx” for inflow) were not. Table 6 lists the percentages of items recalled 
for the four subsets of words. As predicted, subjects recalled words with low Pscale|word values more often 
than words with high Pscale|word values. A 2 (Fscale.word, high versus low) × 2 (Pscale|word, high versus low) 
repeated measures ANOVA confirmed that the effect of Pscale|word on free recall was significant, F(1,31) = 
4.77, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.13. Recall performance for words with low Fscale.word values did not differ 
statistically from recall performance for words with high Fscale.word values, F(1,31) < 1, ns. No interaction 
between Pscale|word and Fscale.word was observed, F(1,31) < 1, ns. 
Free recall performance for the four subsets of words did not correlate with study phase RTs for 
the words (see Table 6). Subjects’ median RTs in making strong/weak judgments at the study phase were 
analyzed. The resulting pattern was markedly different from the result pattern in free recall performance. 
The ANOVA showed no main effect of either Fscale.word or Pscale|word, yet the interaction between Fscale.word 
and Pscale|word was significant, F(1,31) = 6.12, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.17. The pattern of the interaction was 
opposite of the pattern in Experiment 4—when the Fscale.word values were high, items with high Pscale|word 
values were responded to faster than items with low Pscale|word values; when the Fscale.word values were 
low, items with high Pscale|word values were responded to slower than items with low Pscale|word values. 
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A linear regression analysis was performed, with the percentage of times an item was correctly 
recalled as the dependent variable, collapsing across subjects, and Fword, Fscale.word, and Pscale|word as the 
predictor variables. The regression analysis used the backward variable elimination method. The 
regression analysis failed to find a significant effect of any of the predictor variables. 
The null result of the regression analysis notwithstanding, the observation that subjects were more 
likely to recall words with low Pscale|word values than words with high Pscale|word values paralleled 
established results on free recall with mixed frequency lists (Duncan, 1974; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; 
Gregg, 1976; Gregg et al., 1980; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996). When high frequency and low frequency 
words were presented in the same list, there was a tendency for subjects to recall low frequency words 
better than high frequency words. By dissociating the probability of a task being performed on a word and 
the frequency of the word, this experiment showed that the probability of a task being performed was the 
important factor in determining explicit memory task performance. In fact, the typical word frequency 
effect could be effectively reversed by varying the Pscale|word values of words, such as was the case 






 Experiment 6 measured free recall performance in separate-list, between-subject conditions. High 
word frequency has traditionally been associated with better recall performance when high versus low 
frequency words were presented in separate lists (Duncan, 1974; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Gregg, 1976; 
Gregg et al., 1980; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996). In this experiment, high versus low intention-specific 
frequency (Fscale.word) and high versus low intention-specific probability (Pscale|word) items were presented 
in separate lists rather than mixed in the same list. If intentional history is a general property of memory 
representations, we should expect better recall performance for words with high Fscale.word or Pscale|word 
values than for words with low Fscale.word or Pscale|word values. 
 This experiment examined the simple effects of Fscale.word and Pscale|word separately rather than the 
factorial combination of Fscale.word and Pscale|word, because the number of subjects required for the full 
between-subject factorial design would be prohibitive. Given the lack of interaction between Fscale.word and 
Pscale|word in the mixed-list, within-subject free recall Experiment 5, this focus on simple effects was 
reasonable. However, even with a focus on simple effects only, a complete between-subject design 
comparing the effects of high versus low Fscale.word values and high versus low Pscale|word values would 
still require a large number of subjects. The current experiment therefore employed two different 
semantic judgment tasks. They made it possible to gather data from the same subject (rather than a 
within-subject design factor) on both the Fscale.word and the Pscale|word comparisons while keeping 





Thirty-two Vanderbilt undergraduate students participated in the experiment for experimental 
credits for courses. All subjects were native speakers of English. They had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. All subjects signed a consent form for participation. Two subjects’ data were replaced. One of 
them had study phase RTs that were almost 4 SDs away from the mean RT across all subjects. The other 
subject recalled an exceptionally high percentage of words at test, about 3 SDs away from the mean 
percentage across subjects. 
Tasks and stimuli 
The study tasks involved making beautiful/ugly and strong/weak judgments on the meanings of 
words. For the test task subjects were instructed to write down as many words from the study block as 
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they could remember. The experiment used a total of 16 filler items and 160 experimental items, 80 for 
each judgment task. Experimental items for each judgment consisted of four subsets. Word subsets 1 and 
2, and subsets 5 and 6, were constructed for the comparison between high and low Fscale.word values. They 
varied on Fscale.word values (HF versus LF) and were equated in terms of Pscale|word values. Subsets 3 and 
4, and subsets 7 and 8, were constructed for the comparison between high and low Pscale|word values. 
They varied on Pscale|word values (HP versus LP) and were equated in terms of Fscale.word values. Detailed 
values are reported in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Average word frequency (Fword), intention-specific frequency (Fscale.word), intention-specific 
probability (Pscale|word), study phase RT, and percentages of words recalled for Experiment 6 word 
subsets. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors from independent sample t-tests.  
subset F word F scale.word P scale |word RTstudy (ms) % recalled
beautiful/ugly
1 3,435,500   329,810  0.10 1108(133) 31(4)
2 499,800      49,842  0.10 1201(133) 28(4)
3 483,650      127,595  0.27  890(104) 45(5)
4 4,018,000   146,970  0.04 1198(104) 31(5)
strong/weak
5 2,770,000   311,535  0.11 1249(157) 36(2)
6 402,200      48,941  0.12 1094(157) 36(2)
7 545,250      142,885  0.26 1308(120) 30(3)
8 2,392,000   130,445  0.06 1069(120) 34(3)  
 
Procedure 
 Each subject completed four study-test sequences in this experiment, for example, beautiful/ugly 
(HF) – recall – strong/weak (LF) – recall – beautiful/ugly (HP) – recall – strong/weak (LP) – recall. High 
versus low Fscale.word and high versus low Pscale|word conditions for a judgment task were tested between 
subjects. As in the above example, beautiful/ugly and strong/weak judgments alternated between study-
test sequences to minimize interference in recall across sequences. A subject would finish the two 
Fscale.word sequences (HF and LF) before moving on to the Pscale|word sequences (HP and LP). The order of 
beautiful/ugly and strong/weak judgments and the order of Fscale.word and Pscale|word sequences were 
counterbalanced. Also counterbalanced was the left-right hand mapping assignment for strong/beautiful 
(assigned to the same hand) and weak/ugly responses. 
The instruction for the semantic judgment study blocks indicated which semantic judgment task 
subjects should perform. The instruction stated that subjects would be asked to recall the words later, and 
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that when a word was presented subjects should respond as quickly as possible while avoiding errors. The 
semantic judgment study blocks started with two filler trials, followed by 20 experimental trials, and 
finally two filler trials at the end. The presentation order of experimental items was randomized. Each 
trial started with a ready signal (*) that appeared in the middle of the screen for 500 ms. Then a word was 
presented and remained on the screen until the subject responded by pressing the “z” or “?/” key. The 
interval from the previous trial response to the next ready signal was 500 ms. 
After each study judgment block, there was a 30-sec break during which subjects did simple 
additions and subtractions on the computer. Subjects were then instructed to write down on a blank sheet 
of paper as many words from the previous block as they could remember. They had four minutes to write 
down the words. When four minutes had passed, subjects went on to do another two minutes of simple 
additions and subtractions. The next study-test sequence started after the math. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 For free recall tests, the exact reproduction, inaccurate spelling (e.g., “brethern” for brethren), 
and plural form of experimental items were counted as correct, but derivatives (e.g., “master” for 
mastery) and synonyms (e.g., “influx” for inflow) were not. There were a few rare cases (amounting to 
1% of all recalled words) in which subjects put down a word from a previous study-test sequence. Such 
cases were not included in correct recalls. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, when subjects had performed beautiful/ugly judgments on the 
meanings of words at study, they were more likely to recall words with high Pscale|word values (subset 3) 
than words with low Pscale|word values (subset 4). This difference in recall performance was significant 
according to the independent sample t-test, t(30) = 3.17, p < 0.01. This was congruent with the traditional 
finding in free recall with separate lists. High frequency words were more readily recalled than low 
frequency words when they were studied separately (Duncan, 1974; Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Gregg et 
al., 1980; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996). When Pscale|word values were equated between word subsets 
(subsets 1 and 2), recall performance did not differ between words with high versus low Fscale.word values, 
t(30) < 1, ns. 
 The recall advantage for words with high Pscale|word values in beautiful/ugly judgment was not a 
result of prolonged encoding time during study. As reported in Table 7, words with high Pscale|word 
values had actually led to shorter median RTs than words with low Pscale|word values, t(30) = 2.96, p < 
0.01. Median study phase RTs for words with high versus low Fscale.word values did not differ statistically, 
t(30) < 1, ns. 
When subjects had made strong/weak judgments on the meanings of words, no significant effects 
of either Pscale|word or Fscale.word were observed, t(30) = 1.07 and t(30) < 1, respectively, ns. The lack of effect 
for Pscale|word in strong/weak judgment was most likely a floor effect. Across the Kučera and Francis 
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(1976) word set from which stimuli for this experiment were selected, the median Pscale|word value for 
strong/weak judgment was 0.19. In comparison, the median Pscale|word value for beautiful/ugly judgment 
was 0.11. A Pscale|word value of 0.26 was very high for beautiful/ugly judgment, but it was not so high for 
strong/weak judgment. Words with higher Pscale|word values might be necessary for producing the 
Pscale|word effect in strong/weak judgments, especially with a between-subject design. 
Linear regression analyses on recall performance for the items produced similar results as the 
above analyses. The regression analyses had the percentage of times an item was correctly recalled 
following beautiful/ugly or strong/weak judgments as the dependent variable, collapsing across subjects. 
The regression analyses had Fword, Fscale.word, and Pscale|word as the predictor variables. The backward 
variable elimination method was used. For the recall test following beautiful/ugly judgments, the only 
variable that significantly affected the recall of an item was Pscale|word, with R2 = 0.10, F(1,78) = 8.95, p < 
0.01. The standardized coefficient (β) for Pscale|word was .32, t = 2.99, p < 0.01. For the recall test 
following strong/weak judgments, no significant effect of any of the predictor variables was observed. 
Experiment 5 reproduced the traditional pattern of word frequency effects in mixed-list recall 
with intention-specific probability instead of word frequency. Correspondingly, the current experiment 
showed that it is possible to reproduce the traditional pattern of word frequency effects in separate-list 
recall with intention-specific probability rather than word frequency. When subjects had performed 
beautiful/ugly judgments on the meanings of words at acquisition, the traditional word frequency effect in 
free recall was once again reversed by the variation in Pscale|word values. As is shown in Table 7, words in 
subset 3 had lower word frequencies, yet they were more easily recalled than words in subset 4. Also 
notice that for word subsets 1 and 2, when the Pscale|word values were equated, the Fword and Fscale.word 
values were necessarily confounded. Yet even with combined force, Fword and Fscale.word failed to 






The primary hypothesis in the present work is that intentional history is an inherent part of a 
word’s representation, and that frequency effects in both implicit and explicit memory tasks should be 
specific to the frequency or probability of intentional acts at past acquisitions of a word, instead of the 
frequency of the word independent of acquisition acts. The present work tested this hypothesis by 
comparing the effects of intention-specific frequency (Fscale.word) and intention-specific probability 
(Pscale|word) to the effects of word frequency (Fword) in repetition priming, recognition, and free recall 
tests. The intention-specific frequency and probability are operationalized by the co-occurrences of the 
word stimulus and the semantic scale (e.g. beautiful/ugly) on the Internet, with the assumption that the 
number of times the word and the semantic scale co-occur should be proportional to the number of times 
people have intentionally processed the meaning of the word with respect to the semantic scale. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, memory task performance, whether measured as repetition 
priming in semantic judgments, or sensitivity in recognizing old versus new items, or the percentage of 
items recalled, was affected by the frequency or probability of the intentional act involving the word, and 
not by word frequency. More specifically, in repetition priming tasks, words with low Fscale.word values 
showed more repetition priming than words with high Fscale.word values. In recognition tests, words with 
low Pscale|word values, and to a lesser degree low Fscale.word values, were more accurately recognized than 
words with high high Pscale|word or Fscale.word values. And finally, in free recall tests, when words with 
high and low Pscale|word values were mixed in the same block at acquisition, words with low Pscale|word 
values were more readily recalled than words with high Pscale|word values. When words with high and 
low Pscale|word values were presented separately during study, words with high Pscale|word values were 
more likely to be recalled. The patterns of these intention-specific frequency and probability effects 
mirrored the traditional word frequency effect patterns in repetition priming (Duchek & Neely, 1989; 
Forster & Davis, 1984; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Hayman, 1987; Kirsner et al. 1986; MacLeod & 
Kampe, 1996; Scarborough et al., 1977), recognition (Gardiner & Java, 1990; Guttentag & Carroll, 1997; 
Jacoby & Dallas; Kinoshita, 1995; MacLeod & Kampe), and free recall tests (Duncan, 1974; Gregg, 
1976; Gregg et al., 1980; MacLeod & Kampe). 
The secondary goal of the present work is to compare the effects of the two different aspects of 
intentional history, intention-specific frequency and intention-specific probability, to examine whether 
they differentially affect explicit and implicit memory tests (Graf & Schacter, 1985; Schacter & Graf, 
1986). The results showed dissociable influence of the two factors in explicit and implicit memory tests. 
While intention-specific frequency had major impact on repetition priming in semantic judgments, 
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intention-specific probability turned out to be the primary factor in determining recognition and recall 
performances. 
 
Intentional History versus Word Frequency 
The present results found significant effects of the intentional history on memory for words, and 
no effect at all of simple word frequency. These results supported the idea that frequency information 
associated with a stimulus representation is specific to the intentional acts involving the stimulus. They 
suggest that it may be necessary to re-conceptualize word frequency effects with respect to past 
intentional acts involving words. The intentional history of words presents a parsimonious account for the 
existence of word frequency effects, as well as the lack of it in various memory tasks. According to the 
intentional history account, word frequency effects are found in word identification and lexical decision 
tasks because similar intentional processes are involved in everyday word acquisition situations, in the 
study phases of the experiments, and in the test phases (Duchek & Neely, 1989; Forster & Davis, 1984; 
Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Hayman, 1987; Kirsner et al., 1986; Scarborough et al., 1977). In 
contrast, word frequency effects have not been consistently observed in word stem or fragment 
completion tasks (MacLeod, 1989; Roediger et al., 1992; Tenpenny & Shoben, 1992; for a review, see 
Roediger & McDermott, 1993), presumably because the tasks in which repetition priming was measured 
deviated from everyday word acquisition situations. In other words, word frequency effects are found in 
word identification and lexical decision tasks because word frequencies happen to match the intention-
specific frequencies in these tasks. Word frequency effects are more difficult to find in word-stem or 
fragment completion tasks because word frequencies no longer match the intention-specific frequencies 
for these tasks. 
 
Memory Systems versus Transfer Appropriate Processing 
Advocates of multiple memory systems attribute the dissociation between explicit and implicit 
memory tasks to distinct memory systems these tasks involve (McClelland et al., 1995; Nadel, 1992; 
Schater & Tulving, 1994; Squire, 1986, 1992; Tulving, 1985; Tulving & Schacter, 1990). Processing 
theorists (Blaxton, 1989; Jacoby, 1983; Roediger, 1990; Roediger et al., 1989; Weldon & Roediger, 
1987), on the other hand, argue that many dissociations between explicit and implicit memory tasks could 
be explained in terms of the overlap between study and test tasks in accordance with the transfer-
appropriate processing principle (Bransford et al., 1979; Morris et al., 1977). 
Consistent with the processing account of explicit and implicit memory tasks, the present work 
demonstrated that the intention-specific learning applies to both explicit and implicit memory tasks. 
However, the present work also indicated that there are important differences between explicit and 
implicit memory tasks in terms of how information is utilized, beyond what type of information (e.g., 
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conceptual versus perceptual) is accessed. In the present work, repetition priming varied as a function of 
intention-specific frequency of words, whereas recognition and recall performances were mostly 
contingent on the intention-specific probability of words. This difference indicates that explicit and 
implicit memory tasks might involve distinctive modes of processing. As Sherry & Schacter (1987) 
stated, and echoed by Nadel (1992), the term multiple memory systems “refers to the idea that two or 
more systems are characterized by fundamentally different rules of operation” (p. 440). McClelland et al. 
(1995) proposed the distinction between the hippocampal and cortical systems because of differences in 
the modes of processing (i.e., rapid versus slow learning). According to results in the present work, while 
intention-specific learning should be a general principle for learning and memory, the differential impact 
of intention-specific frequency and intention-specific probability on explicit and implicit memory tasks is 
consistent with the idea of multiple memory systems operating on different rules of learning and retrieval. 
The distinction between intention-specific frequency and intention-specific probability also 
addresses a long standing question about word frequency effects in repetition priming and recognition. 
Word frequencies have seemingly similar effects in repetition priming as in recognition tasks. Low 
frequency words show more repetition priming than high frequency words. They are also better 
recognized than high frequency words (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; MacLeod & Kampe, 1996). Researchers 
have discussed whether word frequency effects in repetition priming and recognition share the same 
episodic origin (Duchek & Neely, 1989; Forster & Davis, 1984; Kinoshita, 1995). In the present work, 
frequency effects in repetition priming were intention-specific frequency effects, whereas “frequency 
effects” in recognition were largely intention-specific probability effects. This implies that while word 
frequency effects in both repetition priming and recognition tasks are episodic in origin, they arise from 
rather different mechanisms. Word frequency effects in repetition priming are not the same as word 
frequency effects in recognition tasks. 
 
Abstract versus Episodic Representations 
In accordance with the instance theory of memory (Logan, 1988), the present work assumes that 
each encounter with a stimulus is encoded and stored as a separate instance. Intention is instrumental in 
the formation of instances because intention as goal-orientedness requires attention. And attention has 
been suggested to be a sufficient condition for binding co-occurring elements into instances (Logan & 
Etherton, 1994). Building on previous studies on repetition priming (Franks et al., 2000; Thompson-Schill 
& Gabrieli, 1999; Vriezen et al., 1995; Xiong et al., 2003), recognition (Bransford et al., 1979; Morris et 
al., 1977), and recall (Tulving, 1979; Tulving & Thomson, 1973), the present work inferred that intention 
is an inherent part of memory instance, and theorized that stimulus representation should include a 
collection of intention-specific instances. 
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The experiment results supported this cumulative, intention-specific, instance view of memory 
representations. Intention-specific frequency or probability effects were found in both explicit and 
implicit memory tasks, whereas no effects of word frequency were observed. These results are hard to 
explain if words are represented as abstract lexical entries. The present work provides strong evidence for 
the instance, or episodic, view of semantic representations, and presents a challenge for the abstractionist 
view of semantic representations (for reviews see Bowers, 2000; Tenpenny, 1995). 
The present work, however, with the blocked study and test design, does not exclude the 
possibility of a short-lived, abstract component of word representation that is not affected by semantic 
context or task demand. Some studies showed that with masked prime or very brief presentation of the 
prime frequency had no effect on repetition priming (e.g., Forster & Davis, 1984; Versace & Nevers, 
2003). Repetition priming under such conditions were short-lived, fading into non-significance within just 
seconds. It was assumed to be due to transient variations in the activation level of abstract representations. 
Priming studies on morphologically related words also supported the existence of abstract word 
representations. Fowler, Napps, and Feldman (1985) found the same amount of repetition priming from 
inflected or derived words to their base forms as from base forms to base forms, even when the inflected 
words and the base forms did not fully overlap in terms of orthographic or phonological representations 
(e.g. from “clarify” to “clear”). This was considered evidence for a common lexical entry for 
morphologically related and derived words. 
Instead of siding with one or the other in the abstractionist-versus-episodic debate, the present 
work speculates that there may be at least two layers to word representations. The morphological studies 
(e.g., Fowler et al., 1985) may have reflected a more abstract layer of word representations, whereas 
studies like Jacoby and colleagues’ (Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby et al., 1989), studies on semantic judgments 
(Thompson-Schill & Gabrieli, 1999; Vriezen et al., 1995; Xiong et al., 2003), and the present work have 
reached into a much richer, episodic, layer of semantic representations. Upon reviewing the abstractionist-
versus-episodic debate, Tenpenny (1995) called for a hybrid model to account for all the empirical 
findings. The multi-layer view presents just such a model. Such a view exists implicitly in 
neurocomputational models of semantic memory in the form of separate layers of processing units 
(McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985; Rumelhart & Todd, 1993). It is consistent with the claim that there were 
multiple components to repetition priming (Forster & Davis, 1984; McKone, 1995; McNamara, 2005). It 
also parallels the distinction between activation patterns in left perisylvian (word form) areas and 
sensorimotor cortices in response to words (for a review, see Pulvermüller, 1999). 
 
Context, Intentional History, Transfer, and Stroop 
The present work suggests that intentional history is an inherent part of a stimulus’ 
representation, and operationalized the intentional history of words by Google word co-occurrence 
 42
counts. The fact that word co-occurrence counts could produce meaningful experimental results is a 
perfect illustration of the power of encoding context. People may not have a particular task when they 
read a word in everyday life, but there is always an encoding context in which the word appears, and that 
encoding context can decide how people intentionally process the words. This has implications for other 
psychological studies. 
For example, Franks et al. (2000) investigated transfer between various judgments on words and 
speculated that characteristics of the words and/or the required judgment might cue subjects into making 
certain judgments on words even if the experimental instruction did not ask for such judgments. For 
instance, when presented with the word diamond, a subject very likely would think of its meaning as 
being valuable, even though the required study task was strong/weak judgment. Franks et al. referred to 
such unsolicited judgments as “automatically elicited intentional processes”. If the automatically elicited 
intentional processes in the study phase matched the required judgment task at test, repetition priming 
would be observed. The present work indicates that the intentional history of words may be the 
“characteristics of the words” that can interact with the encoding context and lead to unsolicited 
intentional processes. If a word has a high frequency or probability of being involved in an intentional act 
in the past, as is the case with diamond and valuable judgment, such habitual intentional process may be 
easily elicited, even if it is not required by the task at hand. Repetition priming due to the match between 
unsolicited intentional processes and test task should not be taken as evidence for transfer between the 
required study and test tasks. Transfer studies may need to take into account the intentional history of the 
stimuli when interpreting the results. 
As another example, the famous Stroop phenomenon (Stroop, 1935) can also be interpreted from 
the intentional history perspective. In Stroop task, subjects try to name the color of the ink a word is 
written in instead of reading the word. This proves to be a difficult task, because it is difficult to inhibit 
the reading response and name the ink. From the intentional history perspective, word-reading is 
presumably extremely high in intention-specific frequency and probability, whereas color-naming is low 
in intention-specific frequency and probability. In accordance with the above mentioned automatically 
elicited intentional process idea, intentional acts with a high intention-specific frequency or probability 
may dominate over intentional acts with low intention-specific frequency and probability. Stroop-like 
phenomenon may be observed whenever there is a large imbalance between the intention-specific 
frequencies or probabilities of two intentional acts. 
 
Summary 
Building on previous works that have suggested learning and memory to be intention-specific 
(Bransford et al., 1979; Morris et al., 1977; Tulving, 1979; Tulving & Thomson, 1973), the present work 
applied the intention-specific principle to the instance theory of memory (Logan, 1988), and theorized 
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that the intentional history of a stimulus is an inherent part of the stimulus representation. The present 
work defined the intentional history of a stimulus with the frequency, and the probability of an intentional 
act involving the stimulus. The effects of the intention-specific frequency and probability were tested and 
compared with the effects of word frequency in repetition priming, recognition, and recall tasks. The 
results supported the intentional history view of stimulus representations. The present work highlighted 
the intentional and episodic nature of memory representations in general, while at the same time 
suggested important differences in the modes of processing between implicit and explicit memory tasks. 
The difference between intention-specific frequency and intention-specific probability effects should 
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